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EDITOR'S NOTE
This English translation has not been published in printed form/Cette traduction
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1 Interest  in Arabic  media is  nothing new,  but  the 11 September 2001 attacks in the
United States heightened and broadened publicly stated interest in relation to public
opinion in Arabic and, more generally, Islamic countries, including in numerous recent
academic  publications  and  collections  (Ayish,  2003;  Hafez,  2001;  Hafez,  2002;
Schlesinger, Mowlana, 1993 ; Middle East Report, 1993; Middle East Journal, 2000; Sakr,
2001). These have addressed, for example, Arabic media systems, representations of the
Arabic world in Western media (Hafez, 2000; see also Samaras, 2005; Dufour, 2005 in the
“Research Notes” section of this issue), or how the Western world is represented in
Arabic media. During the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq, in 2003, this question
became critically  important  inasmuch as  interpretations  in  the  Arabic  media  could
influence the level of support of Middle-Eastern populations for Anglo-American policy
or the capacity of their governments to control information, or broaden their sources.
The English-language media thus consulted, and kept in mind, information published
in the Arabic media (Tumber, Palmer, 2004). The question has lost none of importance
today,  as  illustrated  by  the  fact  that,  at  the  time of  writing  this  paper,  the  Qatari
satellite channel, Al-Jazeera, broadcast a video made by Al-Qaeda members that showed
one of the suicide bombers responsible for the 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks in London –
a  British  citizen  of  Pakistani  origin  –  encouraging  suicide  attacks  and  justifying
assassinations of Western civilians (Burke, 2005). 
2 Although this paper refers to some of the ideas developed during the symposium on
“Islam, media and war” organised at Sussex University in 2002, its intention is not to
address  conceptions  of  communication  in  Islamic  societies  (Schlesinger,  Mowlana,
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1993). Rather, it sets out to analyse the recent development of Arabic media, especially
in the Middle East, and their relationship with public opinion in these countries. This
choice results from the authors’ observations – which we reiterate on several occasions
in this paper – that the Arabic mediascape (Appadurai, 1990) has changed profoundly in
the last ten years, and that these changes have had an influence on Arab public opinion
(Ayish, 2003, 2004; Fandy, Brown, 2005).
3 This topic obviously raises conceptual problems. First, how far is it legitimate to refer
to “Arabic” media, since the term implies that these media form a unified whole? Until
very recently, these media – like others elsewhere in the world – were rooted in the
concept of the Nation-State, insofar as this was the frame of reference for the language
used, the regulatory system, the target readership or the editorial line. But the lack of
political unity in the Arabic world implies a corresponding lack of unity in the media.
Although the idea of a unified media landscape here may be just as unlikely as in the
English-speaking world,  the existence of a common language does endow the latter
with a  sense  of  unity  that,  however  minimal,  is  nevertheless  crucial.  And the very
presence  of  the  new  transnational  Arabic  media  is  largely  the  result  of  the
transnational status of Arabic itself – which leads to a second topic: the role of Islam. To
address this, two points have to be taken into consideration. First, the Arabic nations
have populations that are largely Muslim. Secondly, the transnational status of Arabic
is the result of the development of Islam through history.
4 Despite this, neither the Arabic world, or even the Islamic world, forms a unified whole.
The vision of a universal Islamic community – the ummah – is far from becoming a
reality and has no political equivalent at present: political divisions between the States
concerned  –  not to  mention  the  non-Arabic  States  with  partly  or  entirely  Islamic
populations, such as Indonesia, Pakistan or Iran – prevent this from being achieved.
Any kind of unity over topics of discussion is therefore partial and ambiguous. Thus - as
shown by Gregory Kent – we have to accept that there is both unity and heterogeneity:
a degree of unity based on a common language and religion that, probably, have given
rise to a partly shared culture but, a contrario, differences in religious interpretations,
diverging political traditions and different experiences of colonialism and struggles for
independence have produced the diversity we see today. It goes without saying that the
authors of this paper reject – explicitly or implicitly depending on cases – the idea of a
“clash of civilisations” as propounded by Samuel Huntington (1998).
5 Although  the  Arabic  media  operate  in  the  context  of  the  Nation-State  (language,
editorial  line,  readership,  regulatory  framework),  the  relationship  is  ambiguous,
especially in the case of transnational media. Two characteristics stand out here: the
existence of a transnational language and the fact that, until very recently, the media
in Arab countries were under very strict state control. As shown by Kai Hafez (2001), in
an overview of Arabic media systems, these have been directly dominated either by the
state or by power politics within the political elite and their owners may be agents of
the State, although the printed press is sometimes less controlled than elsewhere or
more autonomous than audiovisual media (Hafez, 2001; Sakr, 2001). One of the main
instruments  of  media  control  were  the  national  press  agencies,  which  served  to
centralise  the  collection  and  dissemination  of  information  concerning  the  country,
both within and outside its borders (Ayar, 2001; Austria Press Agentur, 2002). A study of
the media in Iraq has shown that, before the 2003 invasion, most press information
originated – with one exception, a newspaper owned by Saddam Hussein’s son Uday
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(Huguenin-Benjamin,  2004)  –  from  press  releases  from  the  official  press  agency.
Another study, which covered an earlier period, showed that information directed to
the  Middle  East  was  incomplete  due  to  State  control  (Middle  East  Report,  1993).
Nothing was said, for example, about the Halabja poison gas attacks or about the Anfal,
the genocidal campaign against the Kurds.
6 According  to  Hisham  Milhem  (Middle  East  Report,  1993),  the  Halabja  attack  was
covered  by  the  media  in  Kuwait  and  other  Gulf  States,  but  only  after  Kuwait  was
invaded by Iraq. Events of major importance were used quite shamelessly for strategic
purposes by those in power, as were the media. The articles in this feature, which focus
on an analysis of continuity and change in Arabic countries, are therefore of relevance
to broader studies of democratic and parliamentary discourse (Stanyer, Wring, 2004;
Plattner, Diamond, 2002; Brumberg, 2002). 
7 The subject  of  relationships  between transnational  media  and control  exercised  by
Nation-States appears several times in this special feature. According to Noureddine
Miladi,  for  example,  the  recent  and  well-known  impact  of  the  Al-Jazeera  satellite
channel, broadcast from Kuwait, is due to the fact that politics in Kuwait have allowed
more freedom of expression that anywhere else in the Middle East.  As a result,  the
media  and  politicians  in  other  Arabic  countries  have  come  under  pressure  from
demands in public opinion for the expression and dissemination of different ideas and
information, for example about political, military and other events. In her analysis of
recent reforms implemented in the Gulf States to regulate the media, Naomi Sakr is
more pessimistic: the Arabic States are still exercising strict control over the material
released.  Control  is  not  always  formal,  and  may  for  example  operate  through  the
absence of  a clear definition of freedom of expression and its  limits.  These blurred
boundaries leave a margin for initiative from the authorities, since editorial choices are
often controlled by media owners who are themselves linked to political circles.  As
Monroe Price comments (2003), insofar as the regulatory framework for the media is
always, in part and among other things, a means for keeping a particular social group
in power, the rhetoric used to justify the reform of regulatory frameworks – especially
under  the  pressure  of  globalisation – is  rarely  reflected  in  practice  in  the  reforms
themselves. Naomi Sakr points to the same dissonance in the case of the Gulf States.
8 Nevertheless,  the  situation  has  changed  profoundly  over  the  last  ten  years,  as  the
creation of new transnational media and, especially, satellite television channels, has
lessened  possibilities  for  States  to  control  information  and  opinions  (Amin,  2003;
Fandy, Brown, 2005). This change, which results from new editorial choices that stem in
turn from political choices (by a State or political party), is the core issue addressed in
the analyses contributed by Victoria Fontan and Noureddine Miladi.
9 Furthermore – to turn to a so far little known and rarely addressed topic – the growth
of the transnational Arabic media raises the question of their impact on the Arabic
and/or  Islamic  diasporas,  particularly  in  Western  countries.  If,  as  argued  by  Arjun
Appadurai  (1990),  immigration and the media  are  dominant  forces  in  globalisation,
then  the  use  of  these  media  by  these  populations  is  of particular  importance.  As
indicated above, terrorist networks use videos made by suicide bombers and broadcast
them on transnational media to influence populations (Burke, 2005). Investigating their
influence on French populations with a migrant background, Kamel Hamidou shows
that  their  use  of  Arabic  transnational  media  is  inversely  proportional  to  their
subjective degree of integration in the host society.
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10 More generally, the international character of the networks responsible for attacks in
the West and elsewhere (Bali, Casablanca, Madrid and London, to name but a few), and
the inevitably international scope of counter-terrorist campaigns, raise the question of
how far Western societies are able to influence public opinion within Arabic and/or
Islamic  countries.  It  is  easy  to  show  that  variations  in  these  opinions  are  closely
dependent on current events and therefore on the way these events are understood. A
recent  Pew  opinion  poll  (2005)  among  Muslim  populations  in  seventeen  countries
shows converging and diverging opinions on the subject of terrorism. The trends that
emerge  from the  polls  regularly  conducted  by  this  organisation  show that  Muslim
public opinion varies with the course of events, in the Arabic world and elsewhere. It
has  recently  become clear  that  the  level  of  support  for  terrorist  acts  dedicated  to
defending Islam has dropped. In Indonesia for example, it dropped from 27 % to 15 % in
the space of two years, from May 2003 to July 2005; in Morocco, it dropped significantly
from 40 % to 13 % over the same period,  and from 70 % to 40 % in Lebanon.  But,
reversing this trend, more Jordanians (57 %) said that attacks against civilians are often
justified, an increase from 43% in 2002. In a recent British poll, 6% of British Muslims
thought that the 7 July 2005 suicide attacks in London were justified, and a majority
(56%) said that whether or not they sympathised with the suicide bombers, they could
understand why they were capable of such attacks (YouGov, 2005).
11 This raises several questions. What are the respective roles of Western foreign policy
and Muslim theology in the support expressed for terrorists by Muslim public opinion?
According to the Pew survey (2005), it is “slightly more in favour of bomb attacks when
these are directed against Americans or other foreigners in Iraq”. Furthermore, what
has been the role of the media in the development of these opinions in recent years?
Why is  there majority  support  only in Morocco? Why has confidence is  Osama bin
Laden increased significantly in Jordan (from 5 % in 2003 to 60 % in 2005) and Pakistan
(from 6 % in 2003 to 51 % in 2005),  but dropped by 23 % in Indonesia and 26 % in
Morocco? It is impossible to answer these questions, which demonstrate, moreover, the
difficulties we are faced with – compounded by the fact that, in the topic area we are
concerned with here, it has to be recognised that any attempt to influence Arabic and/
or Islamic public opinion is necessarily dependent, at least in part, on the Arabic media.
On this subject, US foreign policy has invested significantly in the creation of Arabic
media as well as in public diplomacy projects1 (see the contribution from Noureddine
Miladi). It is likely that the receptiveness of Arabic media to messages from the West
will  take  on  a  great  deal  of  importance  in  the  future,  making  the  “mediascape” a
significant variable (Fandy, Brown, 2005).
12 The first theme in this special feature concerns the transformation of the media sphere
in the Arabic world and/or in the Muslim world. The contributions on this theme focus
mainly  on transnational  media based in Middle  Eastern countries  (Kamel  Hamidou,
Victoria Fontan, Naomi Sakr, Noureddine Miladi). The second theme concerns public
opinion  in  these  countries  or  among  their  diasporas  (Victoria  Fontan,  Noureddine
Miladi, Gregory Kent). Sub-themes include analyses of changes in the light of various
determinants, such as technological developments (especially in satellite technology),
regulatory frameworks and the means used to bypass them, as well as responses from
States and target audiences, not to mention the economic decisions underlying the new
media offerings. Finally, these articles investigate the changes taking place in countries
where the media were strictly controlled by the State in the past, through control of
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broadcasting and publishing licences or editorial content (censorship and other less
formal  means  of  control)  (Sakr,  2001  :  103-109).  The  change  stems  first  from  the
inability  of  regimes  to  control  the  transnational  services  offered,  at  least  on  the
receiving end. The fact that editorial choices are made on the basis of decisions by
states  (or  political  parties),  and  not  independently,  is  often  discussed  by  the
contributors (most directly by Victoria Fontan and Noureddine Miladi). Victoria Fontan
argues that the editorial policy of the Al-Manar channel – which, with certain recent
changes, has become at least superficially comparable to that of Western audiovisual
media  services  –  is  the  fruit  of  a  process  that  echoes  the  political  choices  of  the
Lebanese Hezbollah party in a specific political context. And this means that even when
a media institution comes close to Western standards, it can still be instrumentalised
by  a  local  political  agency  that  may  or  may  not  be  open  to  Western  influence.
Noureddine Miladi makes a similar analysis: the cultural and informational innovations
characterising Al-Jazeera’s  offerings,  and which appear to  be the result  of  editorial
independence, are actually the fruit of a political decision. The author argues that Al-
Jazeera’s impact on the Arabic world stems from the fact that its content is distinct
from  broadcasting  services  in  other  countries  in  the  Arabic  world  that  are  still
dominated  by  the  journalistic  output  of  information  ministries  and  their  press
agencies. Al-Jazeera’s arrival on the scene helped to create an Arabic public sphere, a
pan-Arab forum for discussion and debate among people that had never had a voice
before.
13 The analyses from the other authors mainly address political and journalistic aspects,
rather  than  economic  aspects,  because,  as  explained  by  Jihad  Fakhreddine2 (2004),
media owners in the Arab world tend to consider the media as a source of political
influence  rather  than a  commercial  investment.  However,  this  does  not  mean that
changes in the media have been homogeneous. While a service like Al-Jazeera seems
open to different opinions, this is not the case for all broadcasting services, since, as we
have just seen, such openness can cater for the political needs of a group in power. As
Naomi Sakr suggests,  changes to a  regulatory regime can be more ambiguous than
initially thought. Thus, the increasing interest in Arab public opinion is most certainly
a consequence of the “war on terror”. While public interest in Al-Jazeera’s development
has grown, in this context, its impact was already being felt in the Arabic world before
the 11 September 2001 attacks. Although Al-Jazeera has broadcast video tapes obtained
from Al Qaeda, it decided not to broadcast an interview with Osama bin Laden from its
own correspondent  in  Kabul,  Tayssir  Alouni,  on  the  grounds  that  the  content  was
overly propagandist and had no real news value (CBS, 2002). Since then, Al-Jazeera has
never broadcast terrorist representatives live without a commentary or other editorial
accompaniment, to avoid being accused of promoting terrorist propaganda directed at
Arabic populations (Eedle3,  2005).  But the question of  Arabic public  opinion and its
relationships with the development of Arabic media can be considered from several
angles.  Kamel Hamidou compares trends among French populations with a migrant
background with the influence of Arabic satellite channels, while Noureddine Miladi
considers that – as we have already underlined – the indirect impact of Al-Jazeera has
been to increase the pressure of demands for freedom of expression in the Arab world,
a pressure that seems to stem from the open discussions where the voicing of different
opinions has become a hallmark of the Al-Jazeera service. In the last decade, in other
words with the increasing politicisation of Islam, the development of the Arabic media
has been closely monitored by a Western elite (see Gregory Kent’s contribution to this
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feature).  Victoria  Fontan,  on this  subject,  analyses  how far  the  development  of  Al-
Manar’s editorial policy may be linked to Hezbollah’s interpretation of events that are
external to the party. She suggests that these have caused the party to develop a more
“open”  or  “westernised”  editorial  policy,  although  the  Iraq  war  changed  opinions
among the Shia Muslims who made up a significant percentage of the service’s target
audience.
14 This  issue  of  Questions  de  communication also  includes  two other  contributions  on a
related topic:  how events in the Arabic world are presented in the European press,
specifically  in  Greece (Athanassios  N.  Samaras)  and in  the French national  daily  Le
Monde (Lucas Dufour).  A comparison of  these two articles  with those in the special
feature brings out an interesting contrast as regards the “explanatory” role of Islam. To
analysts of media institutions in Arabic countries and/or with an Islamic culture, Islam
is a cultural and political force that can help to analyse the organisational patterns of
these media, whether it is seen as a policy heavily influenced by Muslim values and
capable of attracting popular support in Arab countries (Victoria Fontan), or as a set of
cultural values underlying the discursive norms of the Islamic world (Gregory Kent).
According to the latter, communication structures in the Islamic world are linked as
much to the cultural values of Islam as to its religious and political structures, even if
current developments in the Arab world are tending to blur these relationships and
introduce ambiguities. On the other hand, to those analysing representations of the
Arabic  and  Islamic  worlds  in  the  European  media,  Islam  is  more  an  alibi,  or  an
explanatory detour  –  at  least  asserted as  such -  but  ultimately  has  no explanatory
value,  whether  the  frame  of  thought  is  openly  Marxist  (Lucas  Dufour)  or  calls  on
empirical explanatory schemes of Anglo-Saxon origin (Athanassios N. Samaras). In both
cases, the existence of Islam is a pivotal aspect in the examples from the European
press analysed by these authors. In Greece, the way the press presents terrorist attacks
against  the  US  can  be  accounted  for  by  the  deep-rooted  anti-Americanism  of
contemporary Greek culture on the one hand, and traditional Greek hatred of Islam
(since  the  Ottoman occupation)  on  the  other.  In  Le Monde,  the  opposition  between
Muslims  on  the  one  hand  and  Christians  or  Animists  on  the  other  explains  the
“forgotten”  war  in  Sudan,  although  the  reality  is  different.  In  both  examples,  the
nature of European representations of Islam stems from something which is external to
the Arabic world itself, in other words from ideological tenets that are specific to the
two European countries in question.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Amin H., 2003, “Watching the War in the Arab World”, Transnational Broadcasting Studies 10, 
http://www.tbsjournal.com/amin.html.
Appadurai A., 1990, “Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy”, Theory, Culture,
and Society, 7, 2-3, pp. 295-310.
Arabic-Speaking Worlds and Media
Questions de communication, 8 | 2005
6
Austria Press Agentur, 2002, The Various Faces of Reality-Values in News (Agency) Journalism, Vienna,
StudienVerlag.
Ayar F., 2001, “The Future of National News Agencies : should national agencies give way to
regional agencies?, News Agencies and the Internet, paper contributed to the UNESCO symposium,
Amman (Jordan), Jan.
Ayish M., 2003, Arab World Television in the Age of Globalisation. An Analysis of Emerging Political,
Economic, Cultural and Technological Patterns, Hamburg, Deutsches Orient-Institut.
— 2004, “News credibility during the 2003 Iraq War : a survey of UAE students”, pp. 323-35, in:
Berenger R., ed., Global media go to war : Role of news and entertainment media during the 2003 Iraq war,
Spokane, WA, Marquette Books.
Brumberg D., 2002, “Democratisation in the Arab World”, Journal of Democracy, 13, 4, pp. 56-68,
Burke J., 2005, “Secrets of bomber’s death tape”, Observer, 4 Sept, pp. 8-9. CBS, 2002, “Al-Jazeera
Jilts CNN In Tape Tiff, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/02/01/attack/main327931.shtml.
Eedle P., 2005, “Impacts of Jihadist Internet Subculture on Mainstream Arab Media”,
Communication to the seminar on media and the Arabic public sphere, University of
Westminster, March.
Fakhreddine J., 2004, “Digital Satellite TV Channels Run by Gut Feelings: Pan-Arab Satellite
Broadcasters and Audience Research”, Communication to the seminar on media and the Arabic
public sphere, University of Westminster, Dec.
Fandy M., Brown S., 2005, “Arab Media. Tools of the Governments: Tools for the People ?”, http://
www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/18.html.
Hafez K.,2000, Islam and the West in the Mass Media, Cresskill, New Jersey, Hampton Press.
— 2001, Mass Media, Politics & Society in the Middle East, Cresskill, New Jersey, Hampton Press.
— 2002, “Mediated Political Communication in the Middle East”, Political Communication, 19, 2,
pp. 121-280.
Harkin J., 2005, “The PR campaign for Brand America”, Guardian, 17 Sept., http://
www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1572122,00.html.
Huguenin-Benjamin R., 2004, “Discours à sens unique: l’Irak avant la chute du Baas”, pp. 55-104, 
in: Lamloum O., ed., Irak : Les médias en guerre, Paris/Arles, Sindbad/Actes Sud.
Huntington S., 1998, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order, New York,
Touchstone.
King A.,2005,”One in four Muslims sympathises with motives of terrorists”, Daily Telegraph, 23
May, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/07/23/npoll23.xml.
Middle East Report, 1993, “Politics and the Media in the Arab World”, 180, pp. 16-37.
Middle East Journal, 2000, “Media and the Middle East”, 54, 3.
Pew, 2005, “Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics. Islamic Extremism: common
concern for Muslim and Western publics”, Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 17, 
www.pewglobal.org.
Plattner M., Diamond L., 2002, “Democratisation in the Arab World », Journal of Democracy, 13, 4,
pp. 5-68.
Price M., 2002, Media and Sovereignty, Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Arabic-Speaking Worlds and Media
Questions de communication, 8 | 2005
7
Sakr N., 2001, Satellite Realms: Transnational Television, Globalization and the Middle East, New York, I.
B. Tauris.
Schlesinger P., Mowlana H., 1993, “Introduction », Media and Islam, Media, Culture and Society”, 15,
pp. 5-89.
Stanyer L., Wring, D., 2004, “Public Images, Private Lives: the Mediation of Politicians Around the
Globe”, Parliamentary Affairs, 57, 1, pp. 1-223.
Tumber H., Palmer J., 2004, Media at War: The Iraq Crisis, London, Sage.
NOTES
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